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The Fragmentation of the Chinese
Domestic Market
Peking struggles to put an end to regional protectionism
Sandra Poncet
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 The degree  of  integration  of  the  Chinese  domestic  market  has  taken on  particular
importance since China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed, the
opening up of the Chinese market to foreign companies can only be effective if free
trade is guaranteed domestically. The preparedness of the central authorities to put an
end to local protectionist measures has become apparent with the commitment to their
WTO partners to ensure free access and free circulation of goods, services and capital.
The fear of the Chinese leaders that domestic impediments are a source of friction with
their partners would seem to explain the recent steps taken.
2 The idea of domestic economic integration was promoted at the third plenary session
of the sixteenth central committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), devoted to
perfecting  the  socialist  market  economy,  in  October  2003  in  Peking.  Local
protectionism  appeared  as  one  of  the  main  concerns,  while  the  leaders  had  the
objective  of  taking  the  reform  process  further,  providing  for  more  balanced
development and maintaining a sustained growth rate in order to absorb the workforce
released by the restructurings from agriculture and state-owned enterprises.
3 A World Bank memorandum of October 2003 is of this view: “A domestic market that is
flexible and integrated is  vital  for the development of  Chinese competitiveness and
growth, as well as for the structural adjustment of the Chinese economy. A free and
integrated domestic market for goods and services, coupled with a free entry and exit
for firms, allowing the most productive ones to grow and take advantage of economies
of  scale,  facilitate  the  spread  of  technologies,  and  stimulate  improvements  in
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productivity that increase the competitiveness of firms and growth. (...) In the same
way, the structural adjustment currently underway is all the more likely to produce
sustainable, long-term results if it takes place within an integrated domestic market,
one operating in accordance with the laws of the market place”1.
4 The fragmentation of the Chinese economy in an increasingly globalised context is also
problematic for maintaining macro-economic stability. A limited integration—or even
one going backwards—of the Chinese provincial markets suggests a limited capacity on
the part of provinces to absorb the asymmetrical shocks2. For some authors, significant
discontinuities brought about by the provincial borders could even jeopardise national
unity3.
5 This article4 analyses the degree of integration of the Chinese domestic market. First of
all, it aims to identify the causes of local protectionism, before recounting the history
of the commercial integration of the provinces over the course of the 1990s, based on
intra-provincial  exchange  data.  As  Barry  Naughton  has  shown5,  examining  inter-
provincial  exchanges  is  the  most  direct  way  to  study  regional  integration.  This
approach also  enables  an analysis  of  the importance of  domestic  trade in China in
relation to international trade.
 
A spinnery in Suzhou
© Imaginechina
The rise of local protectionism in the late 1980s
6 Trade between provinces developed considerably after the launch of the reforms in the
late  1970s.  Ten  years  later,  however,  problems  related  to  decentralisation  and
distortions  in  the  pricing  system  were  impediments  to  such  exchanges.  Andrew
Wedeman has described these two stages in the development of local protectionism6.
First, between 1987 and 1989, there were many inter-regional wars for the supply of
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resources. The regions producing raw materials blocked and even banned the export of
scarce resources. The manufacturing regions, seeing their supply of essential inputs
threatened, then launched counter-offensives, unleashing real clashes that were based
in a  multitude of  products  ranging from strategic  inputs  for  industry  (cotton,  silk,
tobacco, wool and tea), to foodstuffs (cereals, eggs, pork), and local spice specialities
(mint oil, aniseed…) 
7 The wool wars constituted a good example of this7. They broke out in the productive
provinces, essentially in the north-west (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and
Xinjiang). These provinces adopted a policy of “local production, use and sale” that
required  a  limitation  on exports  to  the  rest  of  the  country  in  order  to  satisfy  the
growing demand for local wool transformers. The introduction of production quotas
was accompanied by export restrictions (concerning both tariffs and non-tariffs). The
same  logic  was  at  the  root  of  the  silk  wars  that  ensued  in  1988  between  Sichuan
province, the main producer of cocoons, and the coastal provinces that were the users
(Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang). The regions cultivating silk worms went so far as to
deploy armed forces and militia on the borders to prevent the coastal provinces, which
had the resources to offer better prices, from acquiring cotton. The rice war of 1988
between Guangdong province and the producing province of Hunan, or the cereal war
between 1987 and 1989, that saw Fujian province pitted against producing provinces
such as Hubei, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui and Henan, also illustrated the tensions born
from the distortions in the pricing system and the divergence of  interests between
provinces.
8 A second form of regional protectionism appeared at the end of 1989, one that this time
concerned  imports  from  other  provinces.  Local  governments,  confronted  with
stockpiles  and budgetary  restrictions,  due  to  the  recession and the  tight  monetary
policy of then Prime Minister Li Peng, restricted or outlawed the importation of many
goods. At the time of the recession of late 1989, the manufacturing coastal provinces
flooded the country with their unsold stock. Many inland provinces drew up lists of
goods which were banned from being imported and set up “inspection posts” to collect
taxes  and  fines.  The  restrictions  mainly  affected  manufactured  goods,  particularly
television  sets,  household  appliances,  bicycles,  stereos  or  electrical  equipment.
Virtually all the provinces, even the most open ones like Guangdong or Peking, had
recourse to protectionist measures. Thus, Peking limited imports of wood from Hebei
province in 1992. Yet, these sorts of measures were especially adopted by the western
provinces anxious to protect local production, such as Hubei, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Qinghai
and most especially Xinjiang province.
9 Local governments implemented their protectionist policies through the use of all sorts
of  measures:  road  blocks,  the  seizing  of  merchandise,  ad hoc taxes,  administrative
charges,  biased  technical  standards,  bureaucratic  red  tape8.  Outside  firms  were
confronted  with  enormous  difficulties,  whether  for  the  purchase  of  premises,
equipment or land,  or for obtaining finance.  They could become purely and simply
victims  of  the  theft  of  goods  or  of  the  vehicles  being  used  to  transport  them.  A
prohibition  on  sales  of  certain  imported  goods  was  commonplace,  parallel  to  the
promotion  of  local  production  and  its  distribution  through  preferential  financing
arrangements. 
10 The situation came to be of such concern that in November 1990, the State Council and
the Central Committee of the CCP had to make repeated calls for the dismantling of the
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“vertical” and “horizontal” impediments to trade, for regional specialisation and the
mobility of factors, advocated by the reforms.
The origins of protectionism
11 Local  protectionism can  be  explained  by  two  structural  factors9.  On  the  one  hand,
decentralisation, launched in 1980, gave added financial responsibility to the provinces
without, however, providing them with more resources. On the other hand, the less
developed  regions  pursued  a  policy  of  industrialisation  through  substitution  for
imports, in order to offer less money to the coastal provinces.
12 The generalisation of protectionism has been interpreted as a manifestation of serious
shortcomings in the reform programme10. Distortions in pricing had existed well before
1978 (and were surely more widespread), but they were compensated for by the central
government’s  budgetary  redistribution  policy.  The  latter  taxed  the  industrialised
regions and reallocated,  via fiscal  subsidies,  a  part of  their profits  to the provinces
producing raw materials. Indeed, in spite of the increases in the purchase price of raw
materials, particularly in the agricultural sector, the pricing system in the early days of
the reforms gave a clear advantage to industry to the detriment of agriculture, thereby
creating a “wedge factor between agricultural and industrial  prices”.  The provinces
producing raw materials (agricultural or energy sectors) lost out, suffering both from
the depreciation of the prices of the goods that they sold and the high prices of the
processed goods that they bought. On the other side, the provinces that specialised in
light industry benefited twice over, in that they bought their inputs for a low cost and
sold processed goods for a handsome profit. The extraction of a financial surplus in
agriculture nationally to guarantee the financing of a rapid process of industrialisation
had constituted a key element in the strategy of development prior to the reforms.
13 The  system of  compulsory  delivery  (tonggou)  for  strategic  goods  (cereals,  energy…)
maintained prices artificially low with respect to industrial goods. Farmers would never
have accepted selling their produce to the state if a free market had been allowed11.
Prior  to  1978  and  even  until  recently,  agricultural  produce  was  divided  into  three
categories. The first included cereals, cotton, oilseed, and medicinal herbs. The second
covered most of the inputs used by the food industry like meat, eggs, vegetables or
fruit. The third category contained remaining agricultural produce, but unlike it, the
first two were subject to a quota system, within which the state required that a part of
the production be given up to it at a fixed, depreciated price. The irrationality of this
pricing system induced a transfer of profits from the regions producing raw materials
(in the centre and west of the country) towards the manufacturing provinces on the
coast.
14 The  reform  of  the  fiscal  system  in  1980  put  an  end  to  the  redistribution  to  the
disadvantaged provinces; and the implementation of the policy of “separation of fiscal
centres”  amplified  the  feeling  of  injustice  felt  by  the  land-locked  provinces.
Decentralisation  made  each  province  responsible  for  the  management  of  its
expenditure based on its local revenues. As these came in large part from industrial
profits, the provinces became very sensitive to the industry-agriculture relative prices.
Whereas the coastal regions still benefited from the wedge effect of prices, the inland
provinces that produced raw materials  suffered from these distortions,  without the
central government being able to compensate them by reason of its lower returns.
15 The fiscally disadvantaged regions therefore used the new powers obtained through
decentralisation to launch into policies of industrialisation and turned to protectionism
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to limit the imports of consumer goods from the coast and facilitate the development of
infant industries sheltered from outside competition. As every jurisdiction was keen to
develop its industrial base and keep its own resources, all types of industry were to be
found in all of the provinces. This meant that factories making fridges, television sets
and  other  household  appliances  existed  practically  everywhere,  leading  to  major
operations that were often less than optimal, and hence hardly competitive, especially
in times of  recession.  The industrialisation of  the provinces flew in the face of  the
principle of comparative advantage.
16 The  central  government  was  unable  to  manage  the  protectionist  behaviour  of  the
provinces, something that was magnified both by the centre’s preferential policy and
the actual motivations of provincial officials: “the provincial governments set up the
policy of geben qiancheng (everyone runs their own race) or gexian shentong (everyone
shows their  particular  achievements),  which resulted in a  situation of  gezi  weizheng
(everyone acts consciously without regard for the general interest)”12. The absence of
any  co-ordination  between  the  provincial  governments  not  only  brought  about  a
duplication of activities, but also the implementation of local preferential policies and
protectionist measures. Clashes between provinces with identical industrial structures
became inevitable, as they struggled to get their inputs and gain markets.
17 Another  source  of  protectionism―adding  to  the  pricing  distortions  and  the  fiscal
reform―lay in the flagrant bias of the policy of development in favour of the coastal
regions. The central authorities gave priority in terms of investment to the coast and
facilitated the rapid development of the east by allowing it to keep a greater part of its
income in foreign currency and to create new financial instruments. This favouritism
magnified the gap between the east and the west, by increasing the competitiveness of
the coastal regions.
18 Disputes went hand in hand with the poorly controlled macro-economic fluctuations.
At times of  growth (1985-1988),  the coastal  industries massively bought the needed
inputs, causing an increase in the price of raw materials such that the less efficient
producers  in  the inland regions could no longer pay for  their  inputs.  At  the other
extreme, during periods of recession (1989-1990), the country’s interior saw itself being
flooded with manufactured goods from the east. Inter-regional clashes for resources in
times of expansion were thus followed by import restrictions in periods of recession. 
19 The disputes were made possible by the absence of any legislation banning the inter-
provincial  trade  barriers.  Several  laws  and  regulations  were  adopted  by  the  State
Council between 1980 and 1990, but they were not given any priority status and figured
in catch-all texts. 
20 The protectionism of the provincial authorities with regard to goods from the rest of
the country was part  and parcel  of  the twin strategy of  preserving socio-economic
stability and maximising fiscal receipts. The barriers to inter-provincial trade had the
goal of limiting the unfavourable social, economic and political consequences of the
reforms  (retrenchments,  bankruptcies  of  local  firms,  declining  profits)13.  Local
protectionism emerged as a strong fiscal autonomy of the local authorities and high
unemployment, where the public sector provided the lion’s share of job opportunities
and where labour-intensive industries predominated.
Regional policies since the early 1990s Peking’s response to regionalism
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21 The central leadership quickly took on board the danger represented by the centrifugal
forces  of  regionalism and clearly  criticised the policies  of  industrialisation through
substitution for imports resulting in the proliferation of less than optimal firms14. As
early as  1990,  Li  Peng and Zhou Jiahua,  the President of  the Planning Commission,
pointed  out  the  damage  wrought  by  regional  protectionism and announced urgent
measures to fight against the chaos brought on by regionalism. In actual fact, however,
the central authorities had to be content with verbal threats and changes in provincial
leadership. It was forced to admit that the emergence of regionalisms, even if it put the
country’s unity in danger,  was inseparable from the process of opening up and the
reforms, the extension of which was vital for the political survival of the Party.
22 The few concrete steps taken by the central  authorities  to  discourage protectionist
practices did not manage to get the provincial authorities to see reason15. They were
targeted at particular cases. Thus, following disputes over the supply of silk cocoons
between  Zhejiang  and  Jiangsu  provinces,  the  Zhejiang  provincial  authorities  were
criticised, and forced to pay a fine and engage in self-criticism. 
 
Artificially low fixed prices for cereals have hit agricultural regions hard
© Imaginechina
23 However, some developments enabled a partial response to be made to the primary
causes of the disputes. The impatience of the inland provinces to benefit also from the
reforms was finally heard at the start of the 1990s with the calling into question of the
priority of coastal development and the model of spreading economic development on
which the sixth and seventh five-year plans were based (1981-1985 and 1986-1990)16.
The central authorities were keen to promote regional equity and hence to favour the
development of the country’s interior in step with that of the coast. The reform of the
system of subsidising external trade, initiated in 1991, reduced the measures in favour
of the special economic zones and the coastal cities. The subsidies were abolished and
there was a harmonisation of the system of hard currency retention. This policy of
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more equal treatment of the various provinces favoured the take-off of trade directly
managed by the inland provinces.
24 The eighth five-year plan (1991-1995) abandoned the tripartite (coast, centre and west)
regionalisation of the seventh plan to draw up priorities in relation to sectors. In fact, it
gave  priority  to  agriculture  and  energy,  areas  in  which  the  inland  provinces
specialised. The broadening of the reforms, particularly the decision adopted by the
third  plenary  session  of  the  Central  Committee  in  November  1993  to  promote  a
“balanced regional development”,  and the reduction in pricing distortions that had
been  unfavourable  to  the  producers  of  raw  materials,  reduced  the  protectionist
motivations of the provinces that had felt wronged.
25 The ninth five-year plan (1996-2000) continued on this path, by giving priority to the
fight  against  regional  disparities  on  the  basis  of  significant  investments  in
infrastructure, to co-operation between the coastal and inland provinces, and to the
promotion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade in the west of the country.
Since the 1990s, the central authorities have made many calls for co-operation between
the  provinces  and  promoted  the  creation  of  multi-regional  economic  co-operation
zones.  The objectives  have been,  inter  alia,  the co-ordination of  policies  of  regional
development and the development of inter-border links. But it seems that in spite of
the many co-operation zones thus created, the actual realisations have been few and
far between, in the absence of any preparedness on the part of provincial governments
to subsume their own short-term interests under the long-term ones of the region or
the country as a whole. 
26 The fiscal reform introduced at the beginning of 1994 enabled a recentralising of a part
of  the  tax  revenue  and  hence  a  strengthening  of  Peking’s  power.  But  it  did  not
altogether eliminate the possibility for local governments to increase their revenue by
taking action in terms of the volume of local sales. The new fiscal system did not sever
the link between the government’s income derived from taxation and the health of
local firms. Thus, it  was not a deterrent to protectionist measures since these were
capable of safeguarding the tax base. Moreover, the reform of pricing is not complete
yet, so local governments still have a tendency to favour investment in light processing
industries, to the detriment of the logic of comparative advantage and of long-term
national development.
The present situation
27 The inter-provincial economic “wars” of the kind that took place in the late 1980s have
ceased, but the integration of the domestic market is still impeded on account of the
twin role played by the local authorities, at once regulators and players in the field of
economic activity. Not only do local governments own companies, but they also finance
and regulate them, which means that they have complex and sometimes contradictory
objectives. A firm’s drive for profit in accordance with the laws of the marketplace goes
hand in hand with the objective of maximising employment and growth, as well as local
revenue  derived  from  taxation.  Local  governments  have  control  at  once  over
production, distribution, taxation and subsidies...  they are therefore in a position to
turn to protectionist measures in order to provide for the development of their firms
sheltered from external competition.
28 According to Barry Naughton17,  several  factors have reduced the interest  in having
recourse  to  protectionism.  An  improvement  in  the  transport  infrastructure,  a
reduction in the distortions of the pricing system, as well as a rebalancing of supply
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and demand for raw materials18 have weakened the incentive of local governments to
intervene  in  the  sphere  of  economic  activity.  Furthermore,  interventionist  policies
have  become  more  difficult  with  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  economy.  The
multiplication  of  distribution  networks  has  made  government  intervention  less
efficacious. Barry Naughton also states that the efforts of Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to
reorganise and impose a severe budgetary constraint on the state banking system have
weakened the strong connection that existed between the authorities and local banks.
The stress placed by the central government on the necessary increase in budgetary
revenue  has  made  it  more  costly  and  more  difficult  to  maintain  the  practice  of
supporting  local  firms  through  tax  exemptions  or  hidden  subsidies.  Finally,
interventions  have  become  less  necessary  since  the  national  policy  of  systematic
defence of employment was abandoned in 1996.
29 Yet,  local  protectionist  policies  have  not  disappeared19.  The  methods  used  include
applying  more  rigorous  procedures  and  technical  and  qualitative  standards  to
imported  goods  than  to  local  ones,  granting  local  firms  preferential  access  to  the
banking system and meting out biased treatment to outside firms when it comes to the
settling of disputes through the courts. The international press reports regularly on
protectionist  practices20,  a  case  in  point  being  the  support  given  by  the  municipal
government to Shanghai Volkswagen, a joint venture of Volkswagen and the Shanghai
Automotive Industrial Corp., whereby the company’s Santana model was approved by
the municipality as the car to constitute its fleet of taxis. At the same time, additional
costs were imposed on licence plates and sales tax for cars from outside of Shanghai,
which increased their final purchase price by an additional 10% on average. In Jiangxi
province, supplementary taxes imposed by the provincial authorities amounted to 15%.
For Renault’s Sanjiang model―produced by a joint venture between China Aerospace
and Renault, based in Xiaogan in Hubei province―the surcharge amounted to 70,000
yuan (US$8,500) per car and was the root cause of the withdrawal of the make from
China in the late 1990s.
30 While present efforts at restructuring (particularly the closing down of firms in the
sectors having an overabundance of supply such as in the textile industry, coal-mining
and beer manufacturing) are a step in the right direction towards integration, regional
specialisation and a search for comparative advantage,  their  impact is  for the time
being  difficult  to  quantify.  Moreover,  while  the  central  government  has  been
confirming its commitment to the rationalisation of production put in place at the end
of  the 1980s,  the industrial  policy  of  the ninth five-year  plan made the blunder of
favouring yet a further wave of duplication. Indeed, this plan identified a list of key
industries characterised by a high-yield capacity, a strong technological content and a
potential  for  spreading  economic  development.  These  were,  in  particular,
transportation equipment (cars and motorbikes), electrical appliances, petrochemical
goods,  machines,  metallurgy  and  construction  materials.  The  central  government
encouraged the provinces to develop their own plans for investment and production
based  on  local  specificities  and  likely  future  returns.  The  logical  upshot  was  the
commitment of  massive investment by the provinces  in  most  of  these sectors.  The
over-capacity and over-production of these goods brought about ferocious competition
and a disastrous fall in prices, particularly for the provinces that had developed these
sectors without any consideration for their comparative advantages.
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31 Local protectionism and the impediments to the economic unification of the domestic
market remain current, as attested by the many declarations, regulations and studies
on these subjects since 2000. At the annual session of the National People’s Assembly
(NPA) in March 2000, Wang Zhongfu, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, stated
that  the  administrative  monopolies,  the  imposed  commercial  contracts  and  the
impediments to the market had become “a cancer in the Chinese market”21. In April
2001, the State Council issued a directive outlawing regional barriers22.
 
Prohibitions announced by the State Council in April 2001
• Obliging companies or individuals to use only local goods and services.
• Imposing customs tariffs on roads, at railway stations, ports, airports and at borders to
prevent the entry of external goods.
• Introducing differentiation in the pricing system.
• Applying differential techniques and criteria for evaluating external goods.
• Introducing discrimination in the allocation of entry permits for the local market.
• Adopting a discriminatory policy in the tender process or concerning the investments of
outside companies.
Source : State Council No. 303 Order, Stipulation of the State Council to Forbid Regional Blockade in
Market Economic Activities, 2001.
32 This 2001 regulation was published only in Chinese, without appearing in the English-
language newspapers normally covering economic policy, a practice out of step with
the reporting traditionally given to the other directives. This regulation contained 28
articles and had the aim of establishing a unified, equitable, normal market system,
eliminating  local  protectionist  measures  and preserving  the  economic  order  of  the
socialist market economy. The above insert sets out the clearly formulated prohibitions
and  measures  announced  to  deal  with  cases  of  abuse  of  these  legal  provisions
concerning the suspension of functionaries and prison sentences. 
33 A  2003  study  of  the  break-up  of  the  domestic  market  was  carried  out  by  the
Development Research Centre of the State Council, involving academics, entrepreneurs
and officials in order to assess the importance of impediments to economic activity in
the various provinces23. The results clearly show the tobacco, alcoholic beverages and
automobile sectors to be the worst affected by dint of their high profitability, strong
tax base and monopolistic organisation. Among the main impediments denounced by
the respondents are the job discrimination practices in favour of locals, the difficulties
encountered by migrants in finding a school for their children, the local bias in the way
disputes are dealt with by the courts,  and the preferential treatment given to local
firms in the public tendering process.
The increasing intensity of commercial activity between 1987 and 1997 
34 While there have been many analyses of what curbs the process of national integration,
whether these be natural or cultural impediments or political barriers set up by local
governments, studies on the degree of integration of the Chinese domestic market have
always run into the problem of the absence of data. Until now, researchers have had to
be satisfied with data on transport and the sectorial structure of industrial production.
Similarly, they have had to put up with aggregate pricing data or else attempt to make
deductions based on trade data. Furthermore, most studies have had a limited impact
where conclusions cannot really be generalised in so far as they are limited to a given
region of China or a particular period of time. The objective of the final section of this
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article is to make up for this gap by examining the economic integration of the Chinese
provinces based on trade data taken from the input-output (IO) tables drawn up by the
provinces between 1987 and 199724. 
35 In each province, goods have three potential origins, namely local (or intra-provincial)
production, the importation of goods produced in another province (inter-provincial
importation) and international importation. The policy of reform was followed by a
rapid increase in the rate of opening up to international trade as well as by the growth
in imports. This increase in the imported proportion of consumer goods linked to a
weakening of impediments to international trade implied a drop in one or both of the
other two sources. In so far as the economic reforms have promoted the integration of
the Chinese domestic market in tandem with the opening up internationally, one would
expect imports to take the place of locally produced goods more than of supplies from
elsewhere in the country. However, a statistical analysis of the data on the trade flows
of the provinces between 1987 and 1997 does not confirm this hypothesis.
36 As Barry Naughton has pointed out, on the basis of the 1987 and 1992 data25,  inter-
provincial exchanges are very important, whether measured relative to either GDP or
to foreign trade. This gives the lie to the picture of a Chinese market made up of a
juxtaposition of self-sufficient provinces such as that painted by Audrey Donnithorne
in the early 1970s26. The export and import rates in relation to the rest of the country
amounted  on  average  to  50%  of  the  provincial  GDP.  In  comparison,  the  average
international export and import ratios of national GDP were 16% and 8% respectively
over the period 1987-1997. Table 1 enables us to compare the participation in inter-
provincial and international trade for the coastal, central and western zones.
37 Chinese domestic trade appears to be proportionally higher than trade within Western
Europe,  NAFTA  (North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement)  or  ASEAN  (Association  of
Southeast Asian Nations). The intra-zone exchanges reached 18% of the GDP of Western
Europe in 1999, 5.6% of the NAFTA GDP in 1998, and 12% of ASEAN in 199827. By way of
comparison, the intra-China trade ratio as a percentage of GDP amounted to 38% on
average in 1997. Inter-provincial exchanges were hence very important compared to
international  ones,  which  could  undermine  the  view  of  self-sufficient  Chinese
provinces. Yet between 1992 and 1997, these exchanges were in decline, whereas intra-
provincial exchanges progressed. 
38 Between 1987 and 1997, the importance of inter-provincial exchanges showed a marked
decline,  whereas  international  exchanges  experienced  a  rapid  growth.  While  the
average  inter-provincial  export  rate  was  eight  times  higher  than  the  average
international export rate in 1987, in 1997 it was no more than 1.5. The same downward
trend in the relation between inter-provincial and international trade can be seen for
imports.  A  developing fragmentation of  the Chinese  domestic  market,  such as  that
suggested by Alwyn Young, would thus seem to be confirmed.28 While inter-provincial
trade in China increased in value, it underwent a significant drop as a percentage of
GDP between 1987 and 1997, in particular after 1992. Between 1987 and 1997, inter-
provincial  trade  increased  less  quickly  than  did  the  GDP,  whereas  the  rates  of
international opening more than doubled. While inter-provincial exchanges went up
overall  in  value  by  5%  between  1987  and  1997,  international  imports  and  exports
increased by 13% and 25% respectively. A larger part of provincial trade thus occurred
with foreign partners. 
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1. Movement of the opening up of domestic and international trade of the provinces
Sources: IO tables and “China Statistical Yearbooks” published by the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics (Peking)
39 The  main  partner  of  the  Chinese  provinces  in  1997  remained,  however,  the  other
provinces, although the situation was very uneven, both in terms of development and
level.  While the coastal  provinces,  especially during the 1990s,  stood out through a
rapid decline in the inter-provincial exchange ratio as a percentage of GDP, in line with
a virtually symmetrical growth in their international exchanges, the other provinces
experienced a  less  significant  roll-back of  their  inter-provincial  opening up and,  in
particular,  did  not  benefit  from  any  increase  in  their  rates  of  opening  up
internationally. The coastal provinces appeared as the most integrated, not only with
the  rest  of  China,  but  also  with  the  foreign  market.  In  1997,  the  average  rate  of
international export by the coastal provinces caught up with the level of the inter-
provincial export rate at 37% of GDP. The inland provinces had less significant internal
and international exchanges (30% and 5% respectively in 1997). The provinces in the
west  of  the  country  put  an  end  to  the  progress  of  integration,  their  international
exchanges being quite minor (3%) and their inter-provincial rate of opening up only
half that of the coast (25%).
40 The Chinese regions all have one common feature. This concerns the progressive roll
back  of  the  inter-provincial  opening  between  1987  and  1997.  The  question  then  is
whether  this  corresponds  to  an  effective  reorientation  of  exchanges  linked  to
internationalisation or whether, on the contrary, it may be interpreted as a movement
of  disintegration.  The  drop  in  internal  trade  within  the  coastal  and  interior  zones
happened mainly between 1992 and 1997, which would seem to be coherent with the
chronology of  the reforms and reflect their opening up to international  exchanges,
which  increased  in  particular  after  1992).  The  dynamic  nature  of  inter-provincial
exchanges  was  subject  to  dual  forces.  First,  all  economic liberalisation should have
favoured  exchanges  between  provinces,  in  comparison  with  the  era  of  planned
exchanges and the policy of self-sufficiency. Next, the policy of international opening
up (no longer restricted to the coast, but stepped up and broadened to the provinces as
a whole) should have led to an intensification of relations with the outside world that
seems to have worked to the detriment of internal (intra- and inter-provincial) trade. A
phenomenon of substitution between international and inter-provincial trade certainly
seems  to  have  taken  hold,  particularly  since  1992.  The  predominance  of  inter-
provincial  over  international  trade  thus  appears  to  be  quite  relative  and above  all
temporary.  The  policy  of  opening  up  to  world  trade  by  the  Chinese  provinces  is
something recent following several decades of a virtually totally closed shop and hence
of  necessary  internal  supply.  The  rebalancing  of  exchanges  is  therefore  only  in  its
infancy. The Chinese provinces are still heavily protected from the world market, as
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confirmed by the difficult negotiations on China’s entry into the WTO. It will only really
be possible to reach a conclusion about the importance of inter-provincial exchanges
relative to international exchanges, and hence about the real commercial integration of
the  Chinese  provinces,  once  there  is  a  broader  liberalisation  of  international
exchanges.
41 Moreover,  the view of China as a set of cellular provinces can be excluded only by
comparing  the  part  of  locally  consumed  production  with  that  of  the  production
exchanged with the other provinces. Setting inter-provincial trade on the same footing
as international trade is not enough. We must compare the scope and development of
inter-provincial exchanges with those of intra-provincial  ones.  Table 2 provides the
breakdown of absorption between the three potential sources of goods: international,
inter-provincial and intra-provincial. A province’s absorption are calculated as the sum
of production and imports minus exports. The total imports and exports include trade
with the rest of China and internationally. Logically, the inland and western provinces
appear to be the most self-sufficient, with 80% of their expenses going on local goods,
as against around 20% on products from other parts of the country and a small portion
for foreign goods. Conversely, the coastal provinces appear to be the most outward-
looking both with regard to the rest of the country and international markets.
42 Concerning developments  over  time,  a  drop  in  the  inter-provincial  trade  can  be
observed for  the  period 1987-1997,  in  line  with an increase  in  intra-provincial  and
international trade for the three groups of provinces. Differences appear nonetheless
between these groups for  the sub-periods  1987-1992 and 1992-1997.  In  the western
provinces, the decline in the share of inter-provincial consumer goods mainly occurred
prior to 1992, no doubt in relation to the trade disputes―their being replaced by local
goods. Subsequently, one can notice a relative stabilisation between 1992 and 1997, at a
very low level, around 17%-19%. In the coastal provinces, the drop in the share of goods
from the rest of the country was also significant prior to 1992, but it continued, by
reason this time of the effect of substitution of international imports: the fall back from
27.7% to 22.1% of the share of domestic goods corresponded to an increase from 6.3% to
12.1% of the share of foreign goods, without any change in the share of local goods. In
the inland provinces, the drop in the inter-provincial supply also occurred under the
twin effect of substitution of international and local goods. It would appear that these
provinces,  faced with the rapid take-off  of  the coast,  were engaged throughout the
1990s in the active promotion of  substitution industries for imports sheltered from
competition  with  the  rest  of  the  country  in  order  to  develop  their  economy  and
support employment and the survival of loss-making public enterprises29.
 
2. Movement in the composition of provincial absorption 
Sources: IO tables and “China Statistical Yearbooks” published by the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics (Peking)
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43 It therefore appears that the drop in intensity of inter-provincial trade is due both to
internationalisation and the development of intra-provincial exchanges (greater self-
sufficiency of the provinces). This leads one to have doubts about any real integration
of the domestic market. Indeed, the promotion of the process of internal opening up by
the reforms in parallel with the international opening up was motivated by the search
for  both  static  and  dynamic  gains.  These  had  to  result  from  the  intensification  of
competition, the spread of technological progress and the productive specialisation as a
function of comparative advantage.
44 Prior to the reforms, the policies of inward-looking development led to inefficient and
non-competitive production that completely overlooked the questions of comparative
advantage,  economies  of  scale  and  productive  specialisation.  In  this  sense,  at  a
provincial level, it is logical that with the opening up to world trade, imported goods be
substituted both for locally produced ones (intra-provincial trade) and for goods from
other provinces (inter-provincial trade). It can even be expected that substitution will
occur more to the detriment of local goods than of goods imported from the other
provinces.  Indeed,  the  liberalisation  of  the  economy  should  promote  competition
between the provinces. The reduction in the share of national goods to the benefit of
local production in the absorption of the Chinese provinces, on consumption, between
1987  and  1997,  ran  counter  to  the  logic,  promoted  by  the  reforms,  of  regional
specialisation in  terms of  comparative  advantage and economies  of  scale.  Concerns
about the growing fragmentation of the domestic market cannot but increase.
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RÉSUMÉS
This article analyses the degree of integration of the Chinese domestic market. It recounts the
stages in the development of regional protectionist practices from the late 1980s, and describes
the present situation and the efforts of the central authorities to bring these practices to an end.
It also presents the main structural factors that account for regional protectionism. Finally, the
work studies the economic integration of the Chinese provinces based on trade data taken from
input-output (IO) tables drawn up by the provinces between 1987 and 1997. It makes clear the
drop in the intensity of inter-provincial trade, under the twin pressures of internationalisation
and the development of  intra-provincial  exchanges.  This  movement,  which corresponds to  a
greater  self-sufficiency  of  the  provinces,  runs  counter  to  the  logic  of  regional  specialisation
promoted by the reforms, in terms of comparative advantage and economies of scale.
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